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Abstract
Conflicts over the equitability of transboundary natural resource conservation and 
management schemes have created barriers to effective policy implementation and 
practice. In seeking to overcome these barriers in the context of progressing 
transboundary oceanic fisheries conservation, we explore the divide between equity as 
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defined in principle and as applied in practice in international policy and law. 
Searching for cross-cutting lessons and themes, we first review multilateral 
environmental agreements to see how equity is commonly being defined, understood, 
and then applied in principle. From this analysis, we identify common elements that 
can facilitate the conceptual framing and application of equitable principles in 
practice. Framed within these elements, we then explore how applications of equitable 
principles have performed in two current transboundary conservation and 
management case studies in regional fisheries management and international climate 
change policy. From this analysis, we conclude with some lessons learned which show 
that finding solutions to equity-driven barriers to transboundary conservation, while 
challenging, are well within our existing capacity to develop and execute.
Introduction
Oceanic fisheries conservation and management agreements have broadly promoted 
benefit-driven, cooperative, and inter-generational approaches to resource use for 
decades. This is also the case for other transboundary terrestrial natural resources 
such as forests, rangelands, river basins, and clean air. These inclusive approaches are 
informed by the language and intent of numerous well-established international 
environmental agreements for sustainable development (e.g., LOSC 1982; UNCED 
1992; UNMDG 2000; UNCSD 2012). However, best-written intentions can translate 
poorly into effective practice when it comes to the sustainable use of transboundary 
resources for which usage is rival, exclusion is difficult, and benefits and outcomes are 
shared (Rose et al. 1998; Berkes et al. 2003; Tonn 2003; Lodge et al. 2007; Ostrom 
2007; Grafton et al. 2010; Sommerville et al. 2010).
Understanding what makes one conservation or management scheme a success in 
practice while another fails is a broadly-recognised challenge in the complex and 
integrated whole of human and natural systems; i.e., social-ecological systems (SESs) 
(Berkes and Folke 1998). In terrestrial systems, a growing body of research recognizes 
that critical linkages between many of the successes and failures of environmental 
conservation action in SESs lie in the ability to relate key human social interactions to 
conservation outcomes (Gunderson et al. 1995; Berkes et al. 2003; Folke 2007; 
Ostrom 2007; Bodin and Crona 2009; Vollan and Ostrom 2010; Dandy et al. 2014). 
Similar linkages and lessons are now being explored in the marine environment (e.g., 
see Pollnac et al. 2010; López-Angarita et al. 2014; Österblom et al. 2013).
One key social interaction is the behaviour of resource stakeholders in response to the 
perceived fairness, or equity, of a given conservation and management scheme. These 
stakeholders are individuals, groups, or nation States with a direct interest in an 
environmental good or service. They can affect or be affected by the actions of others 
with similar interests. Global asymmetries in wealth, power, capacity, and need mean 
that the benefits and costs associated with tackling transboundary sustainable 
resource management and conservation challenges are experienced disproportionately 
among these diverse stakeholders. This disproportionality is acutely felt in the 
distribution of income, revenue, and livelihood cost burdens associated with imposing 
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and observing limits on scarce and shared resources. In turn, this can create conflicts 
between stakeholders throughout the natural resources. These conflicts are capable of 
creating a genuine barrier to achieving timely and effective conservation outcomes.
While different shared transboundary resources have evident physical differences and 
exist across scales of governance, they can still share similarities in their broader 
human use characteristics. In seeking innovative solutions to these barriers to 
conservation, it is worthwhile exploring the efforts to equitably manage and conserve 
in broadly similar transboundary resource use environments. Pursuing one of many 
potential avenues of investigation in this regard, this paper focuses on shared 
transboundary resource use at an international, nation State-level scale. By applying 
an international law and policy perspective, it may be possible to identify valuable 
conceptual parallels, differences, and insights from analyses of principles in 
international law and shared conservation and management efforts. Analysis 
outcomes could in turn inform the further discourse necessary to develop more robust 
and equitable resource policy and governance arrangements.
We apply this perspective to explore two international transboundary resource use 
case studies that are currently grappling with equity issues as a barrier to their 
effective conservation and management. The first case study looks at the regulatory 
efforts made to equitably conserve and manage shared and highly migratory 
transboundary oceanic tuna stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). 
The second case study provides a useful counterpoint from outside the maritime 
domain and briefly examines international regulatory efforts to equitably abate 
European greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Setting up the context for this analysis, 
we first look at how equity’s concepts are being defined, understood, and then applied 
in international environmental resource law and policy. Shifting from principle to 
practice, we then focus on comparing the regulatory efforts of both case studies. This 
analysis is followed by a discussion of some of the ‘lessons learned’ from these 
approaches, with a particular focus on applications in transboundary marine fisheries 
management.
Defining equity: how do we know when ‘fair is 
fair’?
Concepts of equity, also interchangeably referred to as ‘fairness’ (Franck 1995; Shue 
1999; Soltau 2009), have played a role in shaping human social norms for millennia. 
These social norms are the customary ‘rules’ that govern both prescribed and 
proscribed behavior in a given societal group and in a given social context (Bicchieri 
and Muldoon 2014). Common terminologies associated with ‘lay’ definitions of equity 
include ‘non-discrimination’, ‘fairness’, ‘impartiality’, and ‘playing by the rules’. 
Bronfenbrenner (1973) broadly defined equity as an ethical judgement consistent with 
socially-established principles of justice.
More technical and practicable definitions of equity are subject to much ongoing 
philosophical, political and legal debate; what is clear is that equity is a complex 
Page 3 of 26Principles and practice for the equitable governance of transboundar...
concept with a definition, intent, and application that varies depending on multiple 
situational and interpretive factors (Ringius et al. 2002; Shue 1996; Shelton 2007; 
Soltau 2009). Despite this recognised complexity and lack of a clear and unifying 
definition for ‘equity’, equitable concepts have persisted in the language of multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) for decades (Shelton 2007). These international 
laws and regulatory policies provide a commonly accepted operational framework for 
addressing cooperation, compliance, and the appropriate use of international 
transboundary resources.
Equity concepts in international environmental law
While direct references to equity are few, much of the ‘equity-themed’ language in 
major terrestrial and aquatic MEA’s refers to a need to avoid exacerbating the 
contextual disparities in circumstance between developed and developing countries 
both present and future (See examples: UNCHE 1972; LOSC 1982; UNCED 1992; 
UNFCCC 1994; UNFSA 1995). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), for example, obliges developed countries to take the lead in 
protecting the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations “on the 
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities” (Art. 3 (1), UNFCCC 1994).
Some MEA’s recognise that equitable international policy approaches should take 
specific vulnerable groups into account. For example, the United Nations “Fish Stocks 
Agreement” Art. 24 (1, 2) (UNFSA 1995) requires parties to take into account the 
special requirements of developing States when adopting conservation and 
management measures, with particular references to food security, dependent and 
indigenous communities, and the need to ensure that measures do not transfer 
disproportionate burdens of conservation action on to developing States.
Equitable concepts are also present in international dispute settlement, but have yet to 
be exercised in practice (Shelton 2007). Article 38 (2) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, provides that the Court may decide 
cases ex aequo et bono (i.e., from equity and conscience) “if the parties agree 
thereto” (Art. 38 (2), ICJ 1945).
Core elements of equity in transboundary natural 
resource policy
Responsibility, rights, and justice intersect to frame discussions about what equity is 
understood to mean in a given context and by whom, how it is used to inform 
decision-making, and why a given action, outcome, or context is considered 
‘equitable’. This section focuses primarily on the distributive dimension of these 
elements.
Responsibility plays a critical role in apportioning accountability and assigning blame 
for action or inaction in resource conservation and management (Ringius et al. 2002). 
Assigned responsibility (i.e., a term which is generally synonymous with obligation or 
duty in international environmental law and policy) is associated with established 
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international legal obligations such as ‘duty of care’ (Arbour 2008; Müller et al. 2009), 
a ‘duty to cooperate’ (e.g., such as through ‘good neighbourliness’ principles), a duty to 
avoid causing harm (e.g., such as through the precautionary principle) or to remediate 
harms (e.g., such as the polluter pays principle), a duty not to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of other States, and a duty to fulfil agreed-upon commitments ‘in 
good faith’ (United Nations 1970). Responsibility requires States, through the 
application of these international legal principles, to reconcile potentially 
incompatible or damaging interests peacefully and in good faith, and to remediate 
when harm has already taken place through their actions.
Rights represent a guarantee of freedoms and entitlements as well as of permissible 
actions (Wenar 2011). A product of prescriptive social norms, the ‘rules’ of rights 
interact with the ‘rules’ of responsibility to assist in procedural and substantive 
interpretations of what is ‘fair’ in a given context.
Looking at legal rights of conduct in an international transboundary resource context, 
the rival and often non-excludable nature of shared resource use means that clear 
stakeholder rights of privilege, power, claim, and immunity (for more on these 
theorised ‘base elements’ of rights see Hohfeld (1919)) can be difficult to identify or 
assert without overlaps and conflict. Conflicts over upstream and downstream 
transboundary watercourse use illustrate this challenge well (See example: Case 
concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia 1997). Because 
asserting a right gives no guidance on how it should be prioritised against another in 
cases of conflict, issues are often resolved by negotiating additional contractual and 
reciprocal rights and responsibilities through bilateral or multilateral treaties (e.g., 
such as the (EU Common Fisheries Policy 1970); (USA-Canada Air Quality Agreement 
1991)). Occasionally, negotiation is not successful and the issue must be brought 
before the courts to establish new precedents (e.g., as in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
case above). In other cases, an absence of formal legal or institutional direction leads 
to the development of informal or ‘acquired’ customary rights. These are widely 
accepted as legitimate and non-discriminatory despite having no formally established 
legal authority (Ringius et al. 2002).
A third defining element of equity in shared resource conservation and management 
addresses the social justice facet of resource burden and benefit allocation. This paper 
is primarily concerned with the distributive aspects of social justice. However, the 
authors note that this is only one of a number of relevant applications of social justice 
worth exploring in relation to conservation issues. Indeed, some scholars argue that 
the social justice dimension of equity should be the driving force and primary focus of 
more effective conservation and management efforts (Hernes et al. 2005; Bundy et al. 
2008).
Distributive justice supports the notion of ‘fair-sharing’, ‘equitable utilisation’ and 
“fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 1999). It is “concerned with the distribution of 
the conditions and goods which affect individual well-being” (Deutsch 1975). 
Distributive justice also guides the procedural relationship between the equity of a 
decision-making process and the perceived equitability of its outcome; acting 
equitably in this context may include procedural duties to notify and consult (Shelton 
2007).
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It is not uncommon for equity and equality to be thought of as one and the same 
(Bronfenbrenner 1973; Parson and Zeckhauser 1993; Shue 1999; Ringius et al. 2002). 
While related, these concepts have some critical distinctions. Sovereign equality is a 
basic principle of international law. In context, this principle recognises that all States 
have both the sovereign right to exploit their domestic natural resources without 
‘outside’ intervention and the responsibility to be ‘neighbourly’ by not abusing that 
right and engaging in activities that result in harm to areas beyond their jurisdiction 
(Shelton 2007).
Formal equality is an objective concept whereby the same unit of responsibility for 
costs (or the same right to be protected from costs) is distributed evenly amongst all 
stakeholders without discrimination (e.g., allocation per capita). Imposing equal units 
of responsibility onto equal subjects of law may be judged as just in some contexts, but 
it may not be socially just if the differences between these subjects are such that 
disparities in individual (dis) advantage are exacerbated. An equitable approach in 
such circumstances might entail “the appropriate treatment of unequals in view of the 
differences between them” (Bronfenbrenner 1973), and seek substantive equality 
between stakeholders through a range of mutually acceptable differentiating criteria.
A number of criteria have been identified by scholars as justification for differential 
treatment in conservation cost and benefit allocation (Parson and Zeckhauser 1993); 
these include capacity, need, entitlement, power, strict equality, ‘greatest good’, and 
‘just desserts’ (Deutsch 1975; Rose et al. 1998; Ringius et al. 2002; Shelton 2007; 
Soltau 2009; Dandy et al. 2014). More than one of these criteria may be relevant to a 
given conservation issue and inform the application of equity decision rules and 
management criteria. Need-based claims are a strong driver of distributive justice 
norms in international law and policy (Deutsch 1975; Rawls 1999; Ringius et al. 2002). 
These claims operate under the rationale that the use rights of some parties, or their 
right to be protected from certain burdensome costs, might ‘justly’ warrant 
prioritisation over those of others if doing so leads towards greater equality of 
opportunity among stakeholders. Need-based claims illustrate the conceptual 
difference between formal equality and equity in the just distribution of resource 
burdens and benefits. It is in trying to address these differences in a way that is seen 
as appropriate or ‘just’ to a given context that the procedural rules of distributional 
equity are developed.
Equity: parameters and process
The presence of equity language in decades of international environmental 
agreements and case law indicates that this multi-faceted concept plays an accepted, 
established and widespread role in addressing shared resource conservation and 
management challenges. From a governance perspective, therefore, the crux of the 
current debate in resource policy does not lie in the principle itself but in how it is 
applied. Resource stakeholder responsibilities, rights, and interests are complex, 
political, and often at odds with each other – finding equitable approaches in such a 
space is an understandable challenge. For example: who decides what ‘fair’ means in a 
given burden or benefit distribution context and with what criteria and authority? A 
more structured and consistent process that identifies the relevant parties and 
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conservation goals, and then discusses the relevance and role of equity in resolving the 
issue at hand could improve the transparency, accountability, and acceptance of 
resource policy processes and conservation outcomes. Thomas Franck was a 
proponent of this more procedural approach to conceptualising equity, concluding 
that equity “captures in one word a process of discourse, reasoning, and 
negotiation” (Franck 1995). Responsibility, rights, and distributive justice provide 
important structural underpinnings to any such process.
This ‘equity process’ could be integrated into regular policy negotiation processes. 
Requiring negotiating stakeholders to be accountable to basic procedural questions 
nested within the conceptual framing elements of responsibility, rights, and 
distributive justice could provide a more consistent and transparent means of 
scrutinising both individual and collective stakeholder contributions to common 
conservation goals (Fig. 1). Depending on the mechanisms and processes used to 
solicit the required inputs in context, the end result of this more structured process 
could help to clarify ‘true’ conservation barriers. This could mean that discrepancies 
between expected principle (i.e., what is laid out and agreed to in international 
agreements and customary law) and observed in practice (i.e., how States apply or 
avoid applying these principles in their own interest) become clearer or it could help 
reveal which ‘core subsystems’ are affecting each other vis à vis achieving individual 
versus common goals (i.e., see Ostrom 2009). Such a process could also inform the 
development of operational criteria for implementing equitable conservation and 
management schemes.
Fig. 1
Conceptual procedural framework for supporting equitable approaches to 
conservation and management. This framework process begins by defining a given 
situation and clarifying its key elements using the framing parameters of 
responsibility, rights, and distributive justice. The initial stage of this process explicitly 
identifies who has a stake in the resource (i.e., who shares accountability for 
outcomes), what freedoms they have with regard to resource use or protection (i.e., by 
what right is a ‘stake’ asserted and on whose authority), and how the benefits or costs 
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resulting from these freedoms are allocated. As key procedural decision-making 
elements are discussed and clarified, the process is guided inwards towards a common 
and situation-specific equitable approach
Equitable approaches in practice
With this conceptual framework in mind, the following section looks at two case 
studies that are illustrative of the current tools being applied to more equitably 
address transboundary conservation and management allocation challenges around 
the world. Both the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), 
established to improve the conservation and management of transboundary fish 
stocks, and the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), designed to 
improve global air quality, have resource conservation and management frameworks 
that incorporate relatively explicit distributional equity considerations into their 
operational objectives. This section provides an overview of the conservation issue and 
allocation challenge being addressed in each case study. It then provides an overview 
of the management tools and supporting policies that have been selected to address 
this challenge before focusing on how elements of responsibility, rights, and 
distributive justice have shaped the way equity was applied in the pursuit of 
conservation goals.
Regional oceanic fisheries: conservation requires 
compromise
In the marine environment, international transboundary fisheries resources are 
cooperatively managed through regional fisheries management organisations 
(RFMOs). The structure, scope, and mandate of these RFMOs are established ‘by 
contract’ through international treaties between States with a ‘real interest’ (i.e., a 
broadly interpretable and non-exclusive stake; see Molenaar 2000) in a region’s 
transboundary fisheries resources. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (LOSC) and the United Nations “Fish Stocks Agreement” (UNFSA) provide the 
overarching legal framework and basis for the establishment of RFMOs and their 
principles and standards for international fisheries governance (FAO 1999). No RFMO 
is exactly the same, but all are additionally supported by a host of treaties, 
conventions, and institutions that support regional cooperation among sovereign 
States while pursuing the ‘higher goals’ of fisheries governance espoused in 
international agreements.
At the most basic level, the right of State sovereign equality forms the basis of the 
principles and standards established for the conservation, management and 
exploitation of transboundary fisheries in RFMOs. This right, backed over time by 
principles of international law and case precedent, allows a State the exclusive right of 
privilege to undertake resource use activities in their own territory, to oblige other 
States not to infringe upon this right against their will, and to require other States to 
enter into contractual agreements to extend their rights into another State’s territory. 
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The articulation of these sovereignty principles to include natural resources occurred 
during a period of de-colonisation in the late 20th Century, when newly emergent 
developing States sought to re-assert control over their territory’s natural resources 
(United Nations 1962; Schrijver 1997; Triggs 2006).
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) is the RFMO 
responsible for the cooperative and sustainable management of transboundary 
fisheries resources in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). The WCPO is 
home to the world’s richest and largest tuna fisheries, with a record value of 
approximately US$7.2 billion reported for 2012 (FFA Database 2013). Unlike the high 
seas tuna fisheries in the marine ‘commons’ of other regions worldwide, the vast 
majority of WCPO catches are harvested from waters under the sovereign jurisdiction 
of Pacific Island States, Indonesia and the Philippines (FFA Database 2013). In effect, 
the property rights over these transboundary tuna fisheries are predominantly shared 
between a small number of developing coastal States. These coastal States then charge 
access fees to foreign distant water fishing States (DWFNs) for the opportunity to 
harvest fish within their waters (Hanich et al. 2010).
Conservation is increasingly a matter of concern in the WCPO as some tuna fisheries 
are now threatened by overfishing and overcapacity (WCPFC 2013a). Given the 
transboundary and migratory nature of tuna, unrestrained exploitation in a particular 
national jurisdiction or on the high seas has the potential to significantly affect catches 
elsewhere. This has potentially devastating consequences for developing island States 
that are heavily dependent on the fisheries for revenue, development opportunities 
and food security (Hanich et al. 2010). Given these concerns, it is necessary that 
WCPO tuna fisheries are managed cooperatively throughout their range – both inside 
waters under national jurisdiction and beyond into the high seas (Langley et al. 2009).
The WCPFC was established by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention 
(hereafter WCPF Convention) upon its entry into force in 2004 (Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission 2000). The WCPFC is made up of over 40 coastal States 
and DWFNs as well as a coordinating Secretariat. This RFMO holds a series of 
scientific and technical meetings throughout the year to discuss different aspects of 
WCPO fisheries management, with a primary focus on tuna. These meetings 
culminate in a week-long annual regular session meeting where Members table, 
debate, and approve or reject by consensus a wide range of legally-binding high seas 
fisheries conservation and management measures (CMMs) for the coming few years.
The WCPF Convention builds on precedents in the LOSC, UNFSA and supplementary 
agreements and provides the WCPFC with some guidance on principles for 
‘distributively just’ allocations of fishing rights and responsibilities among its 
members and ‘cooperative non-members’. Article 30 of the WCPF Convention, for 
example, repeats Article 30 of UNFSA and requires that the WCPFC and its members 
consider the special requirements of small island developing States (SIDS) when 
developing CMMs. Additionally, it prescribes that the global community interest in the 
conservation of fisheries should not result in a disproportionate burden of 
conservation action on developing States (Juda 1997). The WCPFC’s relative youth has 
allowed for the WCPF Convention to incorporate UNFSA language as well as ‘modern’ 
principles like ecosystem based management and participatory rights (Western and 
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Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 2000). The incorporation of these principles 
along with the Convention’s framework basis for decision-making have helped identify 
the WCFC as one of the most successful RFMOs in terms of best practice (Cullis-
Suzuki and Pauly 2010; Parris et al. 2010).
However, while the WCPF Convention and broader international fisheries law provide 
some guidance on how different aspects of WCPO fisheries management might be 
cooperatively and collectively considered, they are ambiguous in their guidance on the 
practical operationalization of equitable fishing rights and responsibilities (Parris et 
al. 2010). For example, there is no definition or clarity provided in the special needs 
provisions of Article 30 to identify what a proportionate (i.e., equitable) distribution of 
the conservation burden (or benefit) entails in practice. The distribution of a 
disproportionate burden of conservation has been a repeated point of conflict and has 
contributed to compliance issues between SIDS and other WCPFC parties in the 
negotiation of new conservation and management measures (Parris et al. 2010; 
Hanich 2012; Miller et al. 2014).
Efforts to address this disproportionate burden have thus far relied on the application 
of numerous CMM exemption clauses. An exemption clause is a contractual 
agreement that specifies the limits to a party’s liability. In the case of WCPFC tuna 
CMMs, the obligation to observe prescribed catch and effort restrictions (e.g., catch 
and capacity limits, seasonal and area closures, or limitations to setting on fish 
aggregating devices) applies to some States but not others. For example, all WCPFC 
States that fish bigeye tuna with longline gear have agreed annual catch limits; 
however, SIDS and members catching less than 2000 tonnes in 2004 are exempt from 
these limits (WCPFC 2013c).
Although these exemptions indicate a willingness among parties to consider and 
address differentiated resource use rights based on capacity and need, their 
application has thus far been at odds with both the best scientific advice provided for 
decision-making and the pursuit of tuna conservation (Parris et al. 2010; Miller et al. 
2014). There is extensive literature on the development of international fisheries 
governance, the evolution of RFMOs, and their ongoing challenges to sustainably 
manage transboundary fisheries. For further reading, selected examples of include: 
Hey 1989; Kaye 2001; Henriksen et al. 2006; Lodge et al. 2007; Allen et al. 2010; 
Grafton et al. 2010; and Russell and Vanderzwaag 2010.
Given current levels of overfishing in the WCPO, the complexity of the region’s fishing 
interests, the concentration of these interests in waters under sovereign jurisdiction, 
and the WCPFC’s jurisdictional limits over these waters (Parris et al. 2010; Hanich 
2012), a sustainable practical solution will require that some or all States agree to 
compromise some of their interests and carry some of the burden of conservation 
efforts for the ostensible collective gain. This raises important questions of distributive 
justice that are fundamental to conservation and management negotiations but are 
currently unanswered. Take, for example, a situation where one group of 
predominantly developed States will benefit from a conservation measure that will 
ultimately rebuild certain tuna stocks. Should those States bear a greater share of the 
conservation burden in comparison to other States who will also share some of the 
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cost burden but receive little direct benefit? How should any compensation for 
imposed burdens be calculated, or applied?
In the absence of any framework to address such questions, negotiations have failed to 
successfully resolve the conflicting vested interests of WCPFC members. WCPFC 
members have supported the need for compromise and an equitable approach in the 
abstract, but have vigorously defended their vested individual interests in the heat of 
negotiations (Hanich 2012; Miller et al. 2014).
In December 2013, the WCPFC adopted CMM 2013–06, a Conservation and 
Management Measure on the Criteria for the Consideration of Conservation and 
Management Proposals (WCPFC 2013b). This new measure requires WCPFC 
members to apply specific questions to any conservation and management proposal to 
determine the nature and extent of its impact of on SIDS and Territories. Among other 
things, the WCPFC is now required to determine which States and Territories must 
actually take action to implement a proposal, and which States and Territories would 
be impacted by the proposal, in what way, and generally to what proportion. Critically, 
however, WCPFC members have yet to implement a successful a framework for then 
distributing any conservation burden beyond the broad principles articulated in 
Article 30.
In December 2014, the WCPFC once again discussed these concerns, but again failed 
to reach agreement at a meeting that was widely described as contentious and difficult 
(Norris 2014; PEW 2014; Undercurrent News 2014). Some attempts were made to 
propose potential processes but these did not receive sufficient support or clarity to 
then resolve key conservation and management stalemates (Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission WCPFC 2014a; WCPFC 2014b; WCPFC 2014c). The 
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency expanded upon their 2013 discussions, 
clarified potential processes, and noted the different forms of potential conservation 
burden that could occur, namely: 1) administrative burdens, whereby States may be 
required to absorb unreasonable costs in order to implement a measure; and 2) 
outcome burdens, whereby States lose revenue or other benefits as a result of a 
conservation and management measure (WCPFC 2014c). Ultimately, however, the 
WCPFC was unable adopt the measures necessary to reduce fishing mortality for 
bigeye tuna to sustainable levels, due to a failure by members to reach agreement on 
measures that would avoid disproportionate burdens of conservation action falling on 
developing States.
While the WCPFC has made some progress towards identifying the tangible national 
impacts of regional tuna fishing with greater transparency, no criteria have as of yet 
been determined for assessing, or more equitably distributing, these impacts. To 
overcome this current political impasse, it is evident that further dialogue is needed to 
better define the responsibilities, rights, and distributive justice of burden and benefit 
allocation (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2
Conceptual procedural framework for supporting equitable approaches to oceanic 
tuna management in the WCPO
International climate change, the EU emissions 
trading system, and the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities
In counterpoint to the above case study, the field of global atmospheric pollution 
abatement provides some of the longest-standing examples of how policymakers have 
sought to incorporate equitable approaches into applied transboundary conservation 
and management. Research and development into equitable international emissions 
abatement policy arrangements was well underway prior to the existence of the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol (e.g., UNAGBM 1995; Phylipsen et al. 1998). In 2005, following the 
policy and negotiation groundwork laid by the Kyoto Protocol and the applied 
successes of smaller domestic emissions trading schemes in the USA and Europe, the 
EU implemented the EU ETS to reduce its emissions of human-caused greenhouse 
gases (Ellerman and Buchner 2007; EC 2012).
The EU ETS is a decentralised and multilateral policy instrument of unprecedented 
size that includes 31 member countries, more than 11,000 individual sources of 
industrial pollution, and regulates 45 % of the EU’s total emissions (in billions of 
tonnes) as of 2013 (Ellerman and Buchner 2007; EC 2012). While its emissions 
allocation processes remain far from perfect (Tonn 2003; Ellerman and Buchner 
2007; EC 2013), it has been nevertheless pioneering in many of its efforts to equitably 
allocate the rights and responsibilities of international emissions burdens and 
benefits.
The EU ETS is representative of a market-based ‘cap and trade’ instrument endorsed 
by the widely-ratified United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) (UNFCCC 1994). The relative popularity of an ETS as a conservation tool 
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comes from its capacity to limit access to a common-property resource through the 
creation and allocation of private use rights, to shift the cost burden of pollution 
control efforts from the controlling authority to the polluter, and to reconcile 
seemingly incompatible economic growth and conservation objectives using a flexible 
and transparent market-based operating framework (Tietenberg 2006).
ETSs require significant negotiation and cooperation among participants in order to 
succeed in practice. While the argument could be made that this makes them 
cumbersome and slow, the same could be said for any process requiring international 
agreement to proceed. ETSs beneficially provide a framework and a platform to 
identify and discuss the role of equitable approaches to conservation outcomes. In a 
conventional cap-and-trade model framework, an overarching administrative body, 
generally agreed upon by scheme participants, is given the responsibility of setting a 
cap on existing emissions, establishing a trading market, and devising a set of 
regulatory and distributive rules for allocating emissions rights based on this cap 
(Tietenberg 2006; Rose and Wei 2008). These emissions rights are allocated among 
participants as quota over some designated time frame (Rose and Wei 2008). These 
quotas effectively represent the participants’ agreed-upon ‘rights’ to pollute as well as 
delineate their individual responsibilities to observe a scheme’s prescribed limits and 
processes so that participants act ‘justly’ in accordance with the collective desired 
pollution abatement outcome.
Scope and scale aside, the EU ETS distinguishes itself from other existing cap and 
trade systems in that it has yielded repeated, explicit, and consensus-driven 
agreement on EU-wide and State-level emissions abatement targets over a 
considerable period of time. Uniquely, this trading instrument is also supported by 
separate complementary international burden sharing arrangements. The Burden 
Sharing Agreement (BSA) for equitably fulfilling the EU-wide emissions cap (in effect 
between 2008 and 2012) and the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) for equitably 
addressing additional state-level emitters (2013–2020) support the implementation of 
this tool alongside other supporting multilateral agreements (EC 2012).
Also unusual in an international setting is the fact that the EU ETS emissions 
allocation negotiations are all coordinated and enforced through a supervening 
international authority – The European Commission (EC). While examples of similar 
international cooperative management organisations exist (e.g., River basin 
Commissions; regional fisheries management Organisations - see first case study), the 
regulatory authority of the EC is far more extensive and integrated with State 
governments; its enforcement capacity therefore remains effectively unmatched in 
practice.
The EU ETS and its complementary policy tools come out of more than a decade of 
international negotiation and discussion about how to appropriately address the 
reduction in atmospheric emissions necessary to combat human-induced global 
climate change (UNAGBM 1995; Phylipsen et al. 1998; Ringius et al. 2002; Ellerman 
and Buchner 2007; EC 2012). The ‘equitable approach’ that emerged from these 
extensive negotiations was the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
(Art. 3 (1), UNFCCC 1994). This overarching concept combines multiple equitable 
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principles of rights and responsibility allocation; principles include formal and 
sovereign equality, good neighbourliness, capacity, and need.
The UNFCCC text provides no guidance on the operationalization of this concept other 
than developed countries “should take the lead” in combatting climate change and its 
adverse effects (Art. 3 (1), UNFCCC 1994). However, the multi-criteria spirit of 
common but differentiated responsibility is evident in some of the more distinctive 
characteristics of the EU emissions cap-and-trade process. Through the initial 
implementation of an EU-wide emissions cap, the EU ETS recognised that EU 
Member States have equal sovereign rights and responsibilities over their internal 
affairs while being simultaneously responsible as ‘good neighbours’ for collectively 
addressing the transboundary problem of atmospheric pollution. However, the 
application of differentiated caps also acknowledged the unequal capacities of 
countries to effectively meet both individual and Europe-wide air quality conservation 
targets (EC 2012). Capacity to contribute to emissions reduction was determined on 
the basis of each member States’ financial capacity or ‘ability-to-pay’ to meet required 
binding emissions abatement targets, or conversely, on its economic need to continue 
to emit for the betterment of its baseline standard of living. Emissions quotas were 
initially allocated freely on the basis of economic capacity and need and were 
measured in terms of a given EU State’s relative indicator of ‘wealth’ (i.e., GDP) in a 
baseline year. This differentiated burden allocation approach saw wealthy countries 
such as Denmark voluntarily ‘take the lead’ and commit to a 20 % reduction in 
emissions, while developing Bulgaria was permitted a 20 % increase in emissions (EC 
2012).
Additional procedural equity provisions included in the EU ETS further distinguish it 
from other cap and trade models. These include ‘new entrant’ and closure provisions 
and the elimination of the precedent of merit-based ex post adjustments of emissions 
allowance allocations based on positive performance (Ellerman and Buchner 2007). 
Phase three of the scheme is phasing in auctioning as a means of allocating a 
percentage of emissions permits and of adjusting the distribution of profits derived 
from emissions trading (Ellerman and Buchner 2007; EC 2013).
Over time, the EU ETS has also distanced itself from customary sovereign rights-based 
distribution practices such as ‘benchmarking’. In context, benchmarking multiplies 
some index of historical activity or capacity by a uniform standard emissions rate to 
allocate emissions quota rights on the basis of ‘inherent’ State sovereignty and 
historical entitlement principles (Ellerman and Buchner 2007). Unlike a ‘use per 
capita’ or proportional allocation approach based on formal equality principles, 
international-scale historical entitlement rights can favour older and more capacity-
rich States in international negotiations by entrenching use rights for the heaviest 
long-term users or polluters (Tonn 2003; Vaillancourt and Waaub 2004; Shelton 
2007). Instead, the EU ETS allocates allowances at the individual factory level based 
on each factory’s respective contribution to emissions within their sector (Ellerman 
and Buchner 2007).
The effort to identify, discuss, and then apply equitable approaches in context are 
reflected in the relative completeness of the conceptual procedural framework (Fig. 3). 
This indicates that considerable critical dialogue has already taken place and that 
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processes have been established to support equitable approaches to emissions 
abatement. Additional dialogue could however be directed towards how framework 
elements might change over time, what processes might also need to change in order 
to remain equitable, and whether the goals driving these equitable approaches are 
actually being met to satisfaction.
Fig. 3
Conceptual procedural framework for supporting equitable approaches to CO2
emissions abatement schemes in the EU
Despite the many distinct incorporations of equity into the EU ETS and its decades-
long ability to sustain cooperative international discourse, this instrument’s overall 
success at meeting overarching atmospheric conservation goals is the subject of debate 
and criticism. Key criticisms include a lack of ambition over overall abatement targets, 
poorly-executed initial permit allocations leading to poor market performance, 
overuse of exemptions, and system vulnerabilities to political interference (Tonn 
2003; Ellerman and Buchner 2007; IPCC 2007). Concerns over the overall equitability 
of the EU ETS approach also remain. The USA and Canada, for example, remain 
resistant to the implementation of a more globalised emissions trading scheme, 
arguing that some countries will get off too easy while their own costs of abatement 
action will be too high (Bush 2001; Environment Canada 2011).
Lessons learned and implications for 
equitable approaches to transboundary 
marine fisheries management
The two case studies above are representative of a growing recognition that an 
appropriate treatment of equity is an essential part of overcoming the human barriers 
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to effective transboundary resource conservation and management in both terrestrial 
and marine environments (Rose et al. 1998; Shue 1999; Ringius et al. 2002; Tonn 
2003; Hernes et al. 2005; Soltau 2009; Sommerville et al. 2010). In order to reach 
conservation goals, transboundary conservation schemes both within and between 
States must tackle a challenging combination of factors at different scales of 
governance, geography, and time. These factors include multiple jurisdictions, joint 
management, diverse interests, and asymmetric power, capacity, and need. The 
diverse rights and responsibilities of different stakeholders in context, as well as their 
different perspectives on what constitutes a just distribution of conservation benefits 
and burdens adds an additional layer of complexity to this challenge. This decision-
making environment means that conservation solutions must necessarily be 
cooperative, consensus-driven, and as transparent as possible.
This analysis has chosen to explore how such challenges might be better addressed 
within the existing framework of international policy and law; however, alternative 
approaches, like the social justice-centric approaches of Hernes et al. (2005) and 
Bundy et al. (2008), are equally worth exploring. The key message in undertaking 
these analyses is that more innovative thinking is required to more successfully 
address the transboundary conservation challenges of the day, and that equitable 
approaches must play a role in this success.
Regional marine fisheries in the WCPO and atmospheric GHG emissions in the EU are 
physically different resources, with different geographies, stakeholders, and sub-
national policy pathways for the implementation of compatible measures. Indeed, 
further critical analysis is needed to address the horizontal and vertical governance 
challenges of implementing more equitable approaches into compatible sovereign 
State measures. At the international level, however, many of the conservation 
challenges of these two resources, and the way decision-makers are trying to address 
these equitably through existing international law and policy frameworks, share some 
striking similarities.
Here, we address four of these similarities: 1) In both cases, there are overarching 
international legal agreements and precedents that can inform the general 
understanding and use of equitable concepts in transboundary conservation and 
management; 2) Both face challenges to the operationalization of these concepts due 
to insufficient guidance by these same agreements and precedents, as well as by the 
selected conservation tool; 3) Both rely on regional governance arrangements to 
coordinate the activities and actions of sovereign States and to provide a consensus-
driven forum to address common goals and issues; 4) Both incorporate equitable 
principles into their different conservation schemes; despite this, both still face key 
difficulties in adequately addressing willingness and ability to pay for conservation.
With regard to the first similarity, applications of equitable concepts in international 
law have persisted for decades despite the strong debate over and lack of ‘unifying’ 
definition for equity. These precedents, such as the principles of good neighbourliness, 
sovereign equality, and ability-to-pay, as well as international legal precedents relating 
to watercourse use, fisheries jurisdiction, and maritime boundaries establish a 
template for equitable transboundary resource benefit distribution across diverse 
stakeholders and under a number of different scenarios.
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However, as the second similarity indicates, there remains a critical divide between 
intent and outcome in these two different transboundary resources. This highlights a 
need for both resource use stakeholder groups to actively engage more meaningfully 
with each other to clarify roles, responsibilities, and rights of conservation action in 
context. This engagement must also consider a mixed, multi-principled approach to 
equity that adequately accounts for differing perspectives on distributive justice. 
Cooperative development of consistent decision-making processes (e.g., such as Fig. 1) 
that identify the ‘boundaries’ of equity in a given context could help avoid the 
endorsement and application of inadequate or contradictory principles that lead to 
inequitable (or non-existent) conservation outcomes in practice.
The limited fisheries conservation outcomes in the WCPFC provide an example of 
what can happen when internationally-accepted equity principles are applied 
selectively to individual advantage and without adequate dialogue or process. Distant 
water fishing States continue to push for sovereignty-based allocations of harvest 
rights or vessel limits based on entitlement and historical activities. This occurs 
despite practical evidence that this approach functionally discriminates against the 
interests of the developing States that they are obliged to consider under international 
law (Hanich and Ota 2013).
In contrast, despite the clear difficulties the EU ETS has faced in effectively 
implementing the market-based component of its conservation scheme, its 
conservation burden sharing negotiations remain some of the most comprehensive 
and transparently inclusive of differentiated, ‘unequal’ participating stakeholders in 
international transboundary resources policy. These negotiations were framed in the 
spirit of common but differentiated responsibilities, which critically recognizes that 
capacity and need are major drivers of perceptions of ‘fairness’ over historical 
entitlement in this context, and that addressing these factors appropriately has played 
a key role in encouraging sustained, shared contributions to collective conservation 
outcomes. However, in operationalising the outcomes of this further dialogue and 
negotiation, it will also be important to consider how applied equity considerations 
might affect overarching conservation goals. For example, both conservation schemes 
currently use policy exemption clauses to address stakeholder capacity and need 
concerns. In the WCPFC, these exemptions are identified as a barrier to effective 
conservation because the exempted development actions of some States have not been 
compatible with conservation-driven caps on fleet capacity (Parris et al. 2010).
The third similarity notes the presence of regional governance arrangements to 
coordinate the activities and actions of sovereign States and to provide a consensus-
driven forum to address common goals and issues. In addition to being supported by 
the diverse stakeholders themselves, equitable approaches to conservation also rely on 
a complex interaction of domestic and international support from institutional, 
political, and financial structures. An overarching mediating authority provides the 
‘common ground’ and guidance necessary for addressing “institutional 
ambiguities” (van Tatenhove 2013) and what Wallace (2000) describes as a “swinging 
governance pendulum” of supranational, intergovernmental, and national arenas. 
Regional arrangements also provide a platform to create regulatory policies that 
clarify the overarching rights and responsibilities of current participants as well as of 
potential future new entrants. It is worth considering if these particular schemes 
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would have succeeded to the extent that they did without the support of such regional 
structures.
The fourth similarity between the WCPFC and EU ETS case studies is that an 
appropriate treatment of willingness and ability to pay remain a key stumbling block 
to the successful realisation of desired conservation outcomes. This is despite efforts 
to incorporate equitable approaches into both conservation scheme frameworks. The 
capacity and will of stakeholders to act in a prescribed way for the common benefit 
while taking on individual costs is critical to the ultimate success of conservation 
schemes. In most cases, a developing country will simply not have the same capacity 
to pay for remediation, abatement, and compensation costs as a developed country 
regardless of its contribution to the problem or level of enthusiasm for a shared 
conservation goal. This issue of capacity is why developed States are given a more 
explicit responsibility to ‘take the lead’ in addressing shared conservation challenges 
in international law.
With regard to will, those being asked to take on the costs of conservation must have a 
sufficient ownership of the perceived problem in order for cooperative conservation 
schemes to attract the necessary support, or willingness-to-pay, for successful actions 
and outcomes (Spiteri and Nepal 2006; Wunder 2007). This ownership is linked to 
the effective establishment of rights, not just in the sense of physical property 
boundaries, but also in the deliberation of responsibility for burden and benefit 
distribution. If the push for action is not sufficiently demanded, developed, and 
endorsed by those potentially affected, then the very presence of some conservation 
schemes may be considered inequitable and yield outcomes with little net 
conservation benefit (Wunder 2006; Gross-Camp et al. 2012).
Moreover, if the benefits of conservation are expected to flow largely to one 
stakeholder group, then other stakeholders will have little willingness to carry a 
conservation burden. In this regard, the WCPFC tuna fisheries continue to struggle 
with achieving the necessary catch reductions in the face of divergent stakeholder 
interests and dramatically unequal benefit flows (Hanich 2012). WCPFC participants 
evidently do not have a uniform relationship with the given resource, and their 
willingness to act therefore differs according to their different opportunity costs. 
Issues of willingness-to-pay as a barrier to effective conservation outcomes have been 
explored at length in the terrestrial payment for ecosystem services (PES) literature 
(Spiteri and Nepal 2006; Wunder 2006, 2007; Börner et al. 2010; Gross-Camp et al. 
2012).
Even when there is sufficient willingness to pay among stakeholders to drive 
conservation action, both the above case studies and examples in PES literature 
indicate that a successful transboundary conservation scheme should also be 
accompanied by appropriate institutional, regulatory, and financial support 
mechanisms (Börner et al. 2010; Clements et al. 2010). These support mechanisms 
contribute to the perceived value and equity of conservation service delivery (Spiteri 
and Nepal 2006). In this regard, voluntary and compensation-based conservation 
schemes have generally been viewed as more equitable at least in transboundary 
terrestrial conservation contexts (Wunder 2006).
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This analysis of two case studies does not claim to represent the complete range of 
issues faced by transboundary resource managers. However, their similarities indicate 
that they are representative of many of these issues; as a result they yield some 
broadly relevant insights to transboundary resource conservation in general. With 
regards to transboundary marine fisheries, however, what are some of the relevant 
takeaway lessons to help inform more effective and equitable conservation policies?
First, if the complexity of equity issues in both case studies is indicative of 
transboundary conservation issues more generally, the successful conservation and 
management of highly migratory and shared transboundary fish stocks will require a 
mixed but coordinated approach to operationalising equity more broadly into practice. 
This mixed approach will likely need to include a combination of binding and 
voluntary management measures to account for State sovereignty rights while 
encouraging “willingness-to-pay” compliance. Such approaches will first need to 
engage more strongly and transparently in marine policy discussions that clarify the 
rights and responsibilities of unequal stakeholders in a “common but differentiated” 
way. These conversations have begun in the WCPFC in their implementation of 
WCPFC 2013–06 and exemption clauses, but the first is incomplete, and the second as 
currently applied is arguably undermining overarching conservation goals. The 
WCPFC, as well as other RFMOs, may wish to consider how creating a separate 
burden sharing arrangement process, such as was undertaken for the EU ETS, might 
be helpful in separating out some of the technical conservation decisions from the 
political ones.
Second, regional institutions like the EC and RFMOs (and others like transboundary 
river basin authorities) provide an arguably indispensable common platform for more 
integrated ‘common ground’ in a complex legal and governance environment. 
Regional institutions not only provide the framework for transparent supervening 
guidance in a complex and dynamic decision-making environment, they are also 
capable of pooling together stakeholder competencies and decision-making processes 
in an otherwise fragmented international policy arena (van Tatenhove 2013). While 
RFMOs have received criticism for their lack of effectiveness in delivering on 
overarching conservation goals (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly 2010), it is worth speculating 
how far international transboundary fisheries management and conservation would 
get without these institutions.
The reality of managing transboundary fisheries, or any transboundary resource for 
that matter, is that difficult and contentious decisions will need to be made by those 
tasked with the responsibility of conservation decision-making. Effective conservation 
actions imply trade-offs, with greater costs borne by current generations for the 
potential benefit of future ones. Conflicts over shared resource use and barriers to 
conservation are likely to persist without greater collective efforts to define, and then 
respond to, the key elements of responsibility, rights, and distributive justice that 
successfully drive equitable conservation and management in both terrestrial and 
marine environments. This paper illustrates that even without a concise definition of 
equity, the precedents and tools already exist to generate more equitable solutions to 
shared resource use problems. Developing and negotiating the necessary refinements 
for greater success in transboundary fisheries management is indeed well within our 
collective capacity.
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